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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002104

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STATE FOR WHA/CAR  
DRL  
S/CRS  
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD  
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR  
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)  
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2011  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SNAR](#) [KCRM](#) [KJUS](#) [HA](#)  
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF INL A/S ANNE W.  
PATTERSON'S VISIT TO HAITI, NOVEMBER 2-4.

Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affairs Thomas C. Tighe for reason 1.4(b).

11. (C) With your visit approaching, Haiti remains in a kind of suspended animation as its population awaits to see what lasting results are produced by President Preval's initiative to control criminality emanating from the slum area of Cite Soleil and break the power of the Cite Soleil gangs. Preval's policy, based on direct negotiations with gang leaders, an incremental increase in the presence of MINUSTAH and Haitian police (HNP) forces in Cite Soleil, and the promise of increased social benefits for gang affiliates, has over the past several weeks produced a marked increase in public order and decrease in kidnapping. Cite Soleil gangs remain heavily armed with their organizations intact, however, and MINUSTAH and the GoH have managed to establish only the most fragile of relationships with Cite Soleil residents they hope to wean away from the gangs. Though Cite Soleil remains the focus of public attention, Haitians are also coming to grips with a new security reality in the wake of the instability that characterized the end of the last Aristide administration and the interim government. The reality is that, independent of the gangs, both petty and serious crime are much more widespread than has been traditionally been the case throughout Haiti, and Haitians will have to accustom themselves to a level of criminality common to most of the other larger cities throughout the hemisphere.

12. (C) In the meantime, GoH and MINUSTAH efforts to implement a more comprehensive security policy and HNP reform proceed haltingly. President Preval's demand that the HNP take a more visible role in and around Cite Soleil has diverted much of HNP Director General Andresol's attention to reform. Additionally, preparations for the final round of national and local elections in December 3 will occupy both MINUSTAH's and the HNP's leadership in the coming weeks. Andresol has taken some key steps in recent weeks, replacing departmental level police chiefs, many of whom were implicated in corruption and drug trafficking, arresting police officers in Port-au-Prince accused of involvement in corruption and kidnapping, and establishing a close working relationship with the government's chief prosecutor for Port-au-Prince, Claudy Gassant, to ensure that the GoH builds strong cases against corrupt officers. With the help of

MINUSTAH advisors, the performance of the HNP's special crowd control (CIMO), SWAT, and anti-kidnapping units has also improved remarkably. The HNP distinguished themselves by their restrained and professional performance during the elections, and the CIMO unit has done an excellent job of policing smaller demonstrations since then.

¶3. (C) Implementation of the MINUSTAH-drafted HNP reform plan hinges on two areas: vetting and certification of existing officers, and the establishment of a functioning administration within the HNP to manage personnel, equipment, procurement, budgeting, and the range of other functions a large organization requires. DG Andresol estimates that between one third and one quarter of current HNP officers would be dismissed under a credible vetting regime, and though he has demonstrated firm commitment cleaning out his force, he also worries about the impact of a vetting program at a time when President Preval insists on maintaining maximum police presence on the streets. No less crippling for Andresol is the almost complete lack of a functioning administration, which limits both his ability to conduct joint efforts with MINUSTAH -- he cannot be sure that his officers will show up when ordered -- and direct his force's own daily operations.

¶4. (C) Our role in supporting the HNP and the reform plans remains central. Though MINUSTAH maintains primary responsibility for providing technical assistance, and other donors, notably Canada and France, have also discussed providing technical support, our material support for the HNP, which ranges from arms and ammunition to the uniforms on their backs and the food their cadets eat at the academy, is the critical factor enabling the HNP to assume greater

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responsibility for basic security and to even contemplate utilizing MINUSTAH resources in implementing more ambitious reform.

¶5. (C) Your GoH interlocutors, particularly Prime Minister Alexis, are likely to stress the need for increased consultation and coordination. This stems from the perception that under the interim government, Haitian officials lost control of basic policy issues, including security policy, to the international donors, who duplicate efforts and do not always respect Haitian sovereignty. With respect to police assistance, this impression is largely unfounded, though GoH officials do chafe under the conditions that we attach to our provision of lethal materials. Rather than argue the point, we continue to express our willingness to consult and cooperate in any manner which the GoH sees fit, and stress our commitment to the long-term effort of building an HNP that is self-sustaining and serves to protect the Haitian people. Your interlocutors will also raise the need for more assistance in combating international narcotics trafficking in Haiti. President Preval himself believes that lack of anti-narcotics support from the U.S. during his first term hampered his ability to govern. Counter-drug cooperation did suffer as a result of unreliable GoH counterparts during the interim government, and the Haitian coast guard, a key partner of ours but long the poor step-sister of Haitian security forces, suffered disproportionately under Arstide and the interim government.

We are hopeful that under the GoH we can both re-establish significant anti-narcotics operations with the newly-established anti-drug unit within the HNP, buttress the role of the coast guard, and cement commitment of senior GoH officials in attacking the powerful drug traffickers that operate within Haiti.

¶6. (C) In sum, we are heartened by the commitment of DG Andresol and the senior levels of the GoH to reform the HNP, attack corruption, and re-establish law and order throughout Haiti. However, the lack of material and human resources at every level of the government, combined with the immediate exigency of providing some semblance of law and order makes

it extraordinarily difficult for these officials to plan and implement longer-term goals. Our security assistance program aims to take those difficulties into account, while maintaining a mix of friendly encouragement and pressure to move reform forward.

TIGHE